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PRE-TRL4L PRESS RELEASES
duel fashion. But when the burden of proof is placed on the defendant
on the one hand and on the state on the other, the whole procedure seems
quite unsatisfactory. Such subtleties of burden of proof certainly confuse
rather than clarify the standards the jury was asked to use in reaching their
verdict.
20
The position taken by Mr. Justice Frankfurter on the problem of insanity
has long been followed by the federal courts in their own procedure.21 How-
ever, this does not necessarily mean that the Oregon procedure violates due
process. There are many instances where the Supreme Court adopts one rule
while leaving the states free to adopt their own rules, e.g., the right to coun-
sel,22 the admission of evidence illegally seized,23 and the privilege against
self incrimination.2 4 And it is readily understandable why the Supreme Court
is reluctant to attack state procedures for dealing with the problem under
due process in the light of our limited psychiatric knowledge.2 5 Nonetheless,
it is rather surprising to see the Supreme Court affirming a state procedure
that violates the notion that an accused will not be put to the hazard of pun-
ishment if the state does not remove every reasonable doubt of his guilt.
PRE-TRIAL PRESS RELEASES BY PROSECUTOR:
STROBLE V. CALIFORNIA
The Supreme Court has recognized the right of the press to comment on
pending litigation ;1 but this freedom is not without limits. The Court also
recognizes that an accused in a criminal case may be deprived of a fair trial
when newspaper accounts seriously prejudice the community.2 The case of
Stroble 'v. Califor?&3 presents serious due process questions related to the
limits beyond which neither the press nor the prosecuting attorney should be
allowed to .comment.
In the Stroble case the prosecuting attorney, before trial, released to the
press the defendant's confession of the brutal sex-slaying of a five year old
girl along with his opinion that Stroble was guilty and sane. The crime, with
all its sordid details, was capitalized on by press, radio, and television.
Through the premature releases of the prosecutor, the public was whipped
into hysteria and furor as indicated by such headlines as: "Lynch Him!
Howls Crowd as Stroble Goes to Court.' '4
On appeal the Supreme Court rejected defendant's principal contentions
that he was deprived of due process because (1) his first confession was
20. It was even contended by appellant that the instructions were so confused and
misleading, the jury believed the appellant had the burden of proof in all the elements of
the case, thus denying appellant's rights of due process. Leland v. State of Oregon, 343
U.S. 790, 800 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
21'. Davis v. U.S., 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
22. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
23. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
24. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
25. For a rather caustic comment on the present state of psychiatric knowledge, see
HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW, 480 et seq. (1947).
1. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) ; Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946);
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Baltimore Radio Show v. Maryland, 193 Md.
300, 67 A.2d 497 (1949), cert. denied 70 Sup. Ct. 252 (1950).
2. Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1"950).
3. Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952).
4. Los Angeles Herald Express, Nov. 18, 1949.
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involuntary 5 and (2) that the inflammatory newspaper articles instigated
by the district attorney deprived him of a fair trial. We are here concerned
with the defendant's second contention.
6
The fundamental problems are two: (1) what evidence is necessary to
prove that newspaper accounts have deprived an accused of a fair trial;
(2) does the fact that the prosecutor instituted such "trial by press"
publications have any relation to the first question-that is, can the action
of the prosecutor, such as here, in and of itself, or by contribution, be suffi-
cient to deprive a defendant of a fair trial? If the answer to the second
question is affirnative, one other question remains-how far ought the
district attorney be allowed to go in releasing pre-trial information of a
prejudicial nature?
Factors Relevant to the Determination of Whether Newspaper Accounts
Have Deprived an Accused of a Fair Trial--The majority opinion considered
three factors in determing that Stroble had not been deprived of a fair trial.
The first was that even though the confession might have been prematurely
released by the prosecutor there were subsequent confessions made during the
trial itself.7 Therefore the confession could be obtained by the press "in
any.event ' 8 for "what transpires in the courtroom is public property. ' -9
Another factor which the Court thought significant was that at no time
during the first trial did Stroble seek a change of venue on the grounds
of a prejudiced community caused by the newspaper articles.'0 It was not
until after Stroble's conviction that he made this claim. The Supreme
Court points out that Stroble's inaction is indicative of an absence of a
prejudiced community. i1
The final element considered by the Court was the time factor. The im-
portance of this factor is amplified by the view of many psychologists that
news reports immediately before or at the beginning of a trial are most
effective because of lack of counter-propaganda and specific knowledge. 12
The Court held that since the inflammatory articles appeared approximately
six weeks before defendant's trial the public passion must have cooled.13
The question of whether there was sufficient time for passion to cool and
prejudice to subside seems to have been much closer in this case than the
majority pointed out. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in his strong dissent,
refers to the California Supreme Court as saying that at the time of
5. The Stroble case also sheds new light on the question of the voluntariness of con-
fessions. The California Supreme Court assumed that Stroble's first confession was invol-
untary as it was coercive under the rule of Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 327 U.S. 274 (1946) ; but
the court affirmed the conviction because of defendant's subsequent confessions made in
court. The United States Supreme Court, which follows the rule that a conviction must
be reversed if it contains any part of an involuntary confession, independently determined
that Stroble's original confession was not coerced. Stroble v. California, 34-3 U.S. 181, 189-
191 (1952).
6. The area of "trial by press" has been well covered. See note 1 supra; and also,
Notes, Controlling Press and Radio Influence of Trials, 63 HARV. L. REv. 840 (1950), When
The Press Collides With Justice, 34 J. AM. Jun. Soc'y 46 (1951).
7. Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 193 (1952).
8. Ibid.
9. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (194-7).
10. Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 194 (1952).
11. Ibid.
12. MURPHY AND NEWCOMB, EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 961 (Rev. Ed. 1937).
13. Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 195 (1952).
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defendant's trial there was much exploitation of the widespread public
excitement over sex-crimes in general and defendant's crime in particular.14
The above elements were considered by the majority in determining
at what point, if at all, actual prejudice and bias is created by newspaper
accounts. But there may be other factors that should be considered.' For
example, the emotional tone of the reports, 15 the extent bf newspaper circula-
tion,16 the manner in which the press treated the stories, and the nature of
the crime itself may all play important roles in determining whether there
has been an unfair "trial by press." Even if all these factors are considered,
in the absence of concrete proof of actual bias, the decision must be a
matter of degree.
Action by the Prosecutor in Releasing Pre-Trial Information,-In addition
to the argument that Stroble was deprived of due process because the
newspapers had aroused public passion, the defense also introduced a strong
corollary argumentY7 This second argument was that it was the conviction-
minded prosecutor who instigated the "crusade" against Stroble by issuing
prejudicial statements of defendant's confession, guilt, and sanity. As to this
contention the Court said that while it could deprecate such action by the
prosecutor it could do no more.' 8 The majority opinion indicates, then,
that even if the prosecutor coipimences "trial by press" proceedings against
an accused, he stands without recourse in the absence of proof of prejudice.
The Court thus gives the public prosecutor a relatively free hand to arouse
public passion to that point just short of the undefined "degree of prejudice"
the Court considers; the mere fact that it was the prosecutor who instigates
such action will not, by itself, deprive one of a fair trial.19
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, however, believes that such measures by a
prosecutor or court officer should be condemned and prevented. In Shepherd
v. Floridae° he said:
It is hard to imagine a more prejudicial influence then a press release
by an officer of the court charged with defendants' custody stating that
they had confessed ... 21
In the Stroble case Mr. Justice Frankfurter further expanded this theory
into the belief that any inflammatory pre-trial releases by a prosecutor
automatically deprives the accused of a fair trial. The most important
reason for this belief is that to allow such action by the prosecutor is
tantamount to permitting the state itself, through the prosecutor who
wields its power, to become a conscious participant in "trial by press.'22
A corollary to this argument is premised, by Justice Franfurter, on the
phrase coined by Holmes and Hughes, J.J., that jurors are "extremely
14. Id. at 201.
15. Brief for Appellants, p. 13, Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952).
Y6. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 193 (1952).
19. Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1950) (sheriff released to the press a confession
by defendants but the alleged confession was never produced in court; Supreme Court
reversed the conviction). It may be inferred from the Shepherd case that one thing a
prosecutor may not do is to release a confession never admissible or introduced in court.
However, this inference cannot be taken too strongly since the Shepherd case involved
elements of mob violence and racial discrimination.
20. Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1950).
21. Id. at 52.
22. Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 201 (1952).
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likely to be impregnated by the environing atmosphere.''2 3 Therefore every
precaution must be observed to keep extraneous influences out of the court
room. 24 The final corollary to the argument is based on the concept that
since the primary role of the prosecutor is to see that justice be done,25
there is no "fair play" where the prosecutor instigates "trial by press"
proceedings and courts condone such action.
26
Possible Solutions-The question as to what is necessary to prove that
newspaper accounts have deprived an accused of a fair trial is difficult to
answer. The Stroble case demonstrates that the ultimate decision must be
one of degree. However, the opinion makes clear that the prosecutor may
provoke public passion and prejudice through press releases so long as
the community does not reach that "undefined degree of prejudice."
The latter proposition is undesirable. The concept of fair play demands
that the defendant have a fair and impartial trial: that the judge and jury
shall be unbiased, that the prosecutor shall protect the inn.ocent as well as
convict the guilty, that guilt should be proved through the processes of
law without the aid of extraneous passion.
The problem lies in finding the most efficient means of preventing the
prosecutor from releasing unwarranted, passion-arousing information to
the press.
One approach has been suggested by the American Bar Association in a
special committee report.2 7 In regard to newspaper discussion of pending
litigation the report said:
Newspaper publication by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litiga-
tion may interfere with a fair trial and otherwise prejudice the due
administration of justice. Generally they are to be condemned.
2 8
More specifically the report prescribed limits beyond which the prosecutor
ought not to go in releasing information to the press:
A statement . . . asking the public to suspend judgment upon the
accused until the charges . . . can be fully investigated, would seem
to be the limit beyond which counsel ought not to go.
29
As a disciplinary measure to prevent miscarriages of justice the Bar
Association further recommended that a breach of these rules should be
punished by disbarment.30
Such would be an ideal solution; however there are no discovered cases
of disbarment proceedings based on these rules.3 1 Further, the difficulties of
23. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 349 (1914).
24. Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 201 (1952).
25. The position of the prosecutor in a criminal case is defined in Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) as "... the representative not of an ordinary party to
a controversy, but of a sovereignty . . whose interest . . . in a criminal prosecution is
not that it shall win a case, but that justice be done . . . while he may strike hard blows,
he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. .. "
26. Mr. Justic Frankfurter found most repugnant the state court's affirmative acceptance
of the prosecutor-instigated "trial by press" tactics as part of the traditional concept of
the American way of the conduct of a trial. Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 201 (1952).
27. Report of the Special Committee on Cooperation Between the Press, Radio and
Bar, as to Publicity Interfering With Fair Trial of Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Pro-
ceedings. 62 A.B.A. REP. 851 (1937).
28. Id. at 859.
29. Id. at 859-860 (italics supplied).
30. Id. at 859.
31. See 5 AM. JuR. Attorneys at Law, §§257-285.
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imposing effective professional discipline encountered in cases where the
conduct is more generally condemned than that in the Stroble case, affords
little basis for hope that the problem will be effectively handled through
threats of disbarment or similar disciplinary measures.3 2
Another possible solution would be for the courts to use the contempt
power to punish officers of the court (including police officers, prosecutors,
and private counsel) for official misconduet.8 3 However, this power has not
been effectively used in the past and, considering the practical pressures
of administrating criminal law, it is doubtful that the power will be effectively
used in the future.
A third possible solution would be to institute contempt proceedings
against the press.3 4 The Supreme Court has determined that there must
be a clear and present danger before courts can apply the constructive
contempt power in curbing abuses of freedom of press.3 5 It is doubtful
that the facts of the Stroble case would present a situation serious enough
to prove a clear and present danger. Although Mr. Justice Frankfurter has
indicated that a clear and present danger may be more readily found
where there is a jury involved rather than a judge alone,3 6 his views have
not yet prevailed upon the Court in this area.
Another possible solution would be to obtain the voluntary cooperation
of the press, radio, and television. Even if H. L. Mencken is not altogether
correct in saying that "journalistic codes of ethics are all moonshine"
3 7 it
nevertheless remains true that such voluntary cooperation would be. very
difficult to obtain. Many newspapers have thrived and apparently are con-
tinuing to thrive on sensationalism. If cooperation entails cutting circula-
tion, there is little doubt that circulation will not be forfeited.
Finally, it has been suggested that, in order to obtain cooperation
between the press and police officers, prosecutors or other high police officials
might give pre-trial or pre-indictment information to the press on the
strength of the press' promise not to release it until the appropriate time.38
In this manner it is hoped that the press would not seek extra information
of its own which might prove prejudicial to both the defendant and the
prosecution. If there is to be such cooperation, the greater burden for it
must rest on the prosecutors and police officials, who are often, as the
Stroble case indicates, reluctant to cooperate to this extent.
Assuming that these remedies fail, as is most often the case, and the
inflammatory material becomes newsprint, what remedies are open to the
accused? Apart from a new trial, the defendant has two remedies; both are
inadequate. First, the defendant may commence a civil suit against the
prosecutor. There are several difficulties here: (1) there is no common law
32. See note 43 A.L.R. 54- (1924-) ; see note 94 L. Ed. 130 (194-9) ; see also note 31 supra.
33. See, Griffin v. United States, 295 Fed. 437 (3d Cir. 1924) ; Ex Parte Davis, 112 Fed.
139 (C.C.D.Fla. 1901).
34. See note 1 supra.
35. Ibid.
36. In the opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter the Supreme Court has not yet decided
on the limit of protection afforded publications which have "injuriously affected" trial by
jury in criminal cases. He believes that since the Bridges, Pennekamp, and Craig cases,
cited note 1 supra, did not involve juries,-they are not controlling. Baltimore Radio Show
v. Maryland, 70 Sup. Ct. 252, 256 (1950).
37. Quoted in 63 HARV. L. Rav. 840, 843 (1950).
38. This suggestion was made by Mr. Lane, editor of the Chicago Daily News, in a
speech at Northwestern University School of Law for the Seventh Annual Short Course for
Prosecuting Attorneys August 6, 1952.
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action for the creation of an unfair trial;39 (2) in general, prosecutors and
quasi-judicial officers enjoy immunity from civil liability.
4 0
The other remedy for the accused is to seek a change of venue by claiming
a prejudiced community.4 1 However, if the accused's original venue was
prejudiced by newspaper, radio, and television, it is quite possible, especially
in a celebrated case, that these mass media of communication will also
prejudice the surrounding areas.
4 2
Since it appears that the suggested methods of preventing the prosecutor
from making press releases have failed, and that once the releases have
been published it is difficult to determine when the press has brought the
public to that "undefined degree of prejudice" sufficient to deprive one of
a fair trial, then perhaps the only effective way to guarantee an accused
his right to a fair and impartial trial is to declare any inflammatory releases
a denial of due process. This is the approach taken by Mr. Justice Frank-
furter in his dissent.
A similar development appears to have taken place in the recent cases
of the court relating to coerced confessions. 4 3 These cases focus less on
the question of whether the particular defendant was actually coerced into
confessing and more on the question of whether the prosecution and police
were guilty of conduct which, by and large, tends toward coercion and
prejudice.
Pre-trial inflammatory information released by the prosecutor is not a
part of the established processes of law by which guilt is proven. If such
actions are to be condemned and prevented then perhaps Mr. "Justice
Frankfurter's answer, denial of due process, is the only feasible solution.
39. See PROSSER, TORTS 777-859 (1941). It should be pointed out, however, that there
may be a statutory tort action for deprivation of a fair trial.
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage
of any state . . . ,subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ...
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law ... " 17 Stat. 13 (1871'),
8 U.S.C. §43 (1946).
It is admitted that a right to a fair trial is protected by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 238 (1939) ; Moore v. Dempsey,
261 U.S. 86, 91 (1922). Therefore, although there are no discovered cases on the point, the
statutory remedy is apparently available. However, to be successful in such an action
one must first overcome the difficulty of proving that the community had reached that
"undefined degree of prejudice."
40. Downey v. Allen, 36 Cal. App.2d 269, 97 P.2d 515 (1940) ; Andersen v. Bishop, 304
Mass. 396, 23 N.E.2d 1003 (1939). It is possible, however, to obtain a money judgment
because the general immunity from civil liability is limited to proceedings in court and
not to proceedings which, while official and public, are not in their nature judicial. Chappell
v. Duney, 16 N.Y.S.2d 477, 173 Misc. 438 (1940). But even if a judgment is obtained a
defendant can get little satisfaction if he has been executed.
41. Under one view the defendant must affirmatively show that there is such a feeling
of prejudice prevailing as will be reasonably certain to prevent a fair and impartial
trial. Buck v. Reigard, 39 Ohio O.P.S. 429, 85 N.E.2d 302 (1949); Downs v. State, 111
Md. 241, 73 At. 893 (1909). Under a second view the defendant must raise only a
reasonable apprehension that he cannot obtain a fair trial. People v. Pfanschmidt, 262
Ill. 41 1, 104 N.E. 804 (1914).
42. For example, in the Stroble case the average daily newspaper circulation was over
1,200,000. The effect and coverage of radio and television could only be speculated upon.
Brief for Appellants, p. 16, Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952).
43. Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948) ; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 327 U.S. 274
(1946); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); See also ALLEN, The Wolf Case:
Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. REV. 1, 25-30 (1950).
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